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Municipal Fiber in the United States: A Financial Assessment
Christopher S. Yoo, * Jesse Lambert, † and Timothy P. Pfenninger ‡
Abstract
Despite growing interest in broadband provided by municipally owned and
operated fiber-to-the-home networks, the academic literature has yet to undertake
a systematic assessment of these projects’ financial performance. To fill this gap,
we utilize municipalities’ official reports to offer an empirical evaluation of the
financial performance of every municipal fiber project in the U.S. operating in
2010 through 2019. An analysis of the actual performance of the resulting
fifteen-project panel dataset reveals that none of the projects generated sufficient
nominal cash flow in the short run to maintain solvency without infusions of
additional cash from outside sources or debt relief. Similarly, 87% have not
actually generated sufficient nominal cash flow to put them on track to achieve
long-run solvency. In addition, 73% generated negative nominal cash flow over
the past three fiscal years, leaving them poorly positioned to make up their
deficits and causing them to fall farther into debt. An assessment based on the net
present value of these projects’ operating cash flow indicates that 53% of projects
would not be on track to breakeven even assuming the theoretical best-case
performance in terms of capital expenditures and debt service. Close analysis of
these projects’ performance reveals that revenue generation likely plays a more
important role in generating cash flow than efficiency in construction costs or
operating efficiency.
Keywords: municipal broadband, government-owned network, fiber to the home,
cash flow, net present value, bond financing
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Introduction
Municipal fiber networks have become an increasingly hot topic in the U.S. The

COVID-19 pandemic heightened public awareness of the critical importance of broadband
connectivity. Support for bringing as many people online as possible led to the inclusion of $65
billion in funding in the Broadband Infrastructure Framework (“BIF”) recently enacted into law.
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This includes $42.5 billion in grants to state and local governments for extending broadband
infrastructure in unserved and underserved areas, improvements to data collection and mapping,
and implementation of broadband adoption programs. The impending issuance of these grants
makes understanding how to get the most out of this limited funding even more important. This
legislation has been referred to as technology neutral, indicating that it does not favor any
technological approach to bringing more people online.
State and local governments will soon confront important decisions about the best uses of
this limited funding.. The role played by municipal broadband is likely to be controversial. For
example, although President Biden initially proposed that broadband infrastructure funding
prioritize broadband networks operated by local governments, nonprofits, and cooperatives, that
provision was omitted from the final BIF legislation. In addition, municipal broadband received
mixed support during the November 2020 election, during which some U.S. cities approved
ballot initiatives authorizing cities to proceed with municipal broadband projects, while other
cities rejected them. 1
States, cities, and federal agencies evaluating whether to fund municipal fiber projects
would benefit from empirical analyses of the success and failure of past efforts. To date, the
literature has drawn mixed conclusions on whether municipal fiber promotes economic growth
(Holt and Jamison, 2009; Kenny and Kenny, 2011; Guidry, Carson and Haon, 2012; Oh, 2019;
Ford and Seals, 2021) or improves price and service quality (Talbot, Hessekiel, and Kehl, 2018;
Chao and Park, 2020; Ford, 2020). A more fundamental limitation of these analyses is that
benefits only represent half of the equation: The other side of any cost-benefit analysis requires

Voters in Denver, Berthoud, and Englewood, Colorado, authorized their cities to opt out of a state law
prohibiting municipal broadband. Voters in Kaysville, Utah, and Lucas, Texas, rejected municipal fiber projects
(Gonsalves, 2020).

1
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considering whether municipal fiber projects are likely to be self-sustaining or whether they are
likely to generate deficits that cities will have to cover with funds from general tax revenue.
Such support may require either one-time subsidies for capital construction or ongoing annual
support for projects that continue to generate annual cash flow deficits. Cities weighing the
tradeoff between funding municipal fiber projects or other potential priorities need the clearest
possible picture of their likelihood of success.
This article is the first to take a more systematic approach using a unique dataset
comprised of the lifetime financial performance of every municipal fiber project in the U.S.
operating in 2011 that provided annual financial reports for their fiber operations. It represents
the only analysis to date that evaluates the financial performance of the entire universe of
municipal fiber projects in the U.S. based on the highest quality data issued by government
sources and metrics generally accepted by the financial community for evaluating viability.

2

Literature review
The academic study of government-owned telecommunications networks began with the

debate surrounding the 1912 nationalization of the British telephone system (e.g., Holcombe,
1911). The UK government’s acquisition of British Telecom touched off a wave of
nationalization that led to nearly universal public ownership by the 1970s, with the United States
being the notable exception (Noll, 2000). 2 The 1984 denationalization of British Telecom led to
a global privatization movement that sparked further study of whether private ownership
improved these firms’ financial performance and service quality (e.g., Bortolotti et al., 2002).

2

Even the U.S. experimented with government ownership during World War I (Janson and Yoo, 2013).
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Municipal Wi-Fi enjoyed a brief paroxysm of support during the mid-2000s, which generated
another wave of scholarship (e.g., Jassem, 2010).
Commentary and popular attention have increasingly focused on municipal fiber. For
example, the Government Accountability Office (2014) published a report analyzing fourteen
federally or municipally funded fiber projects, while the Executive Office of the President (2015)
also issued a report conducting case studies of six municipal fiber projects. Both studies focused
on the impact of these projects on download speeds and prices without analyzing their
sustainability. The small number of empirical analyses of these networks’ financial performance
have generally been published as advocacy pieces rather than articles in scholarly journals
(compare Scott and Wellings, 2005; with Lenard, 2004; Balhoff and Rowe, 2005; Davidson and
Santorelli, 2014). There has been only one study of municipal fiber projects’ financial
performance published in an academic journal, and it examines five years of operating income
for a single project (Beard et al., 2020). Altogether, these studies focused on selected case
studies, were based on short-term snapshots rather than comprehensive assessments of the
projects’ entire lifespans, and analyzed operating income, which, as we will discuss in greater
detail below, is not regarded as the most probative measure of viability. No prior scholarly work
or government publication has systematically assessed the entire universe of U.S. municipal fiber
projects, evaluated projects over their entire lifetime, nor focused on cash flow instead of
income. The closest is an earlier, unpublished version of this study, which analyzed five years of
cash flow for twenty projects (Yoo and Pfenninger, 2017a). 3

3

(2017b).

For our responses to some initial reactions to this previous version of our study, see Yoo and Pfenninger
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Bonds as the Principal Mechanism for Financing Municipal Fiber Projects
Municipal fiber networks require significant upfront investments that typically require

tens of millions of dollars. Because cities rarely have that amount of cash on hand, they
generally finance such projects by issuing tax-free municipal bonds or similar debt, which allow
them to borrow the cash needed for initial construction and then repay the principal and interest
from the returns generated over the lifespan of the project, with the expected life of fiber optic
cables to be twenty to twenty-five years and the expected life of digital switching equipment to
be between twelve and eighteen years (U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2000,
Appendix B). 4 Because municipal fiber projects require an initial construction period during
which they do not generate significant revenue, the debt instruments financing these projects
typically permit interest-only payments during a project’s initial three-to-five years to give them
time to ramp up. Thereafter, payments must cover a portion of the principal in addition to the
accrued interest.
The bond documents for the municipal fiber projects included in this study consistently
reflect the expectation that the projects would generate sufficient returns to service this debt.
First, all of the bonds that provided the initial funding for these projects were issued as “revenue
bonds,” which are defined as bonds expected to be repaid from funds generated by a specific
project or source, as opposed to “general obligation bonds,” which are expected to be repaid
from the city’s sources of general tax revenue, such as property taxes (U.S. Securities and

4
The U.S. Internal Revenue Service (2021, 106) similarly places the depreciable life of distribution plant at
twenty-four years and computer-based switching equipment at 9.5 years for telephone companies. The U.S.
Government Accountability Office (2012, 4) similarly estimates that the useful life of fiber cables to be between
twenty to twenty-five years. The bonds used to finance the vast majority of municipal fiber projects have terms of
between twenty and twenty-five years.

5

Exchange Commission, 2021). 5 For example, Monticello characterized its initial 2008 financing
as “Telecommunications Revenue Bonds” and specified that they were payable “solely from the
net revenues of the FTTP project.” After it defaulted on the 2008 debt, it characterized the new
2014 debt issued to finance the settlement as “General Obligation Bonds.”
Second, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) requires that all municipal
bonds be accompanied by an official statement that brings together all of the information that the
SEC requires municipal bond issuers to disclose. The official statements for all of the municipal
fiber projects that fall within this study consistently note that the debt is expected to be repaid out
of revenues generated by the municipal fiber project.
Third, bond instruments for projects expected to require contributions from general funds
invariably include terms specifying the schedule of payments that cities are expected to make
from general revenue into reserve funds. No such terms appeared in the projects included in this
study.
Fourth, the annual financial reports issued by the cities that fall within this study initially
classified their municipal fiber projects as enterprise funds or independent authorities rather than
governmental or internal service funds. According to Governmental Accounting Standards
Board Statement No. 9 (1989), this signifies that these cities expected these projects to repay
their costs from project revenue and not from taxes or interfund transfers.
Fifth, many annual financial reports state that the cities anticipated these projects would
cover their costs out of project revenue and that cities would not have to make regular
contributions from their tax revenue to defray project costs.

This terminology does not apply projects financed through means other than bonds, such as leases
(Burlington) or certificates of participation (Salisbury and Wilson).

5
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None of these features would have been true had the cities that initiated projects expected
the projects not to be self-sustaining and would require contributions from general revenue. All
indications—the characterization of the bonds as revenue bonds, the language of the official
statements, the lack of provisions requiring contributions from general funds, the way these cities
accounted for their municipal fiber operations, and numerous representations in these cities’
annual financial reports—underscore that the cities initiating these projects did not expect them
to generate shortfalls and instead expected them to cover their costs. Indeed, supporters for the
projects in Dunnellon and Salisbury envisioned that the projects would generate surpluses that
would allow those cities to lower taxes.
In many cases, the projects were promoted as potential drivers of economic development.
To cite perhaps the most prominent example in the U.S., supporters lauded the Chattanooga
project as a “real tool for economic development” (Lohr, 2010) by creating “a high-speed
information corridor allowing Chattanooga to become a hub for future research, information
sharing, and job growth” (City of Chattanooga, 2006, C-3). Similar statements were made in
connection with the projects in Dunnellon and Salisbury and are offered as benefits from the
projects in Monticello, UTOPIA, and Windom.. To this end, Chattanooga’s project began as a
fiber offering to businesses before being expanded to serve residential customers. Similarly,
Wilson, NC built a fiber backbone serving municipal institutions before extending the network to
serve business and residential consumers. The project in Windom was principally motivated by
lowering telecommunication prices for customers..
Whatever the reasons for initiating particular projects, the names of the bonds and the
language included in the official statements, bond instruments, and financial reports all manifest
the belief that the projects would generate sufficient revenue to cover their costs.. Even had

7

these cities not expected these projects to break even, they still would benefit from an evidencebased understanding of previous projects’ financial performance to help them assess the
likelihood their project will require support from general tax revenue or other sources and the
potential magnitude of that support. Regardless of whatever collateral benefits a municipal fiber
project may create, cities must still pay the principal and interest associated with the debt
incurred to build out these networks. Indeed, municipalities that initiate projects that are unable
to cover their costs of debt and operations will have to make up the shortfall from general tax
revenues or default on their debt, either of which would inevitably affect the cost of financing all
of the city’s operations, not just the municipal fiber project.

4

Methodology and data
The approach of this analysis is to assess municipal fiber projects’ viability in both the

short- and long-run. Short-run viability measures the extent to which municipal fiber projects
have been able to cover their costs to date. Those that have been unable to do so necessarily had
to rely on additional contributions from other sources. Long-run viability assesses the likelihood
that a project will break even by the maturity date of its initial debt financing.
4.1

Cash flow as the basis for assessing viability
Financial analysts generally regard cash flow as the preferred basis for assessing a

project’s financial viability. This is because the availability of cash is what determines whether
an enterprise can meet its obligations. Although existing studies and press accounts tend to focus
on operating income, many profitable enterprises become insolvent because so much of their
cash is tied up in illiquid assets that are not available to pay incoming bills.

8

Consider the capital costs needed to build a fiber network. From a cash flow perspective,
projects typically require a large cash outlay during their initial years and require less capital
during their later years, as discussed above. Operating income distorts the impact of this large
initial cash expenditure by amortizing these capital costs across the projects’ expected lifespan as
depreciation expense. The result is that the income statement radically understates the cash
demands during a municipal fiber project’s early years and overstates the demand on cash in
later years. In addition, rapid growth often requires significant increases in working capital.
These cash needs can affect solvency in ways not reflected on income statements.
Factors like these cause net income to provide an incomplete reflection of an enterprise’s
cash needs, which is why the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (1989) began requiring
that every financial report must also include a statement of cash flow in addition to a balance
sheet and income statement. It is also why financial analysts evaluate projects’ likely solvency
based on cash flow forecasts rather than profitability (e.g., Beaver, 1966).
4.1.1

Actual performance: Nominal cash flow (“NCF”)
Nominal cash flow (“NCF”) represents the actual cash flowing into and out of a project.

NCF is therefore free from any uncertainty resulting from assumptions or projections. It is
simply a representation of the cash collected from and spent on a given project. Our NCF
analysis considers the first two components from Statement No. 9 of the Government
Accounting Standards Board’s four required components of cash flow statements: 6
•

Cash flow from operating activities (sometimes called cash flow from operations
(“CFO”)) represents operating revenue less operating expenses, excluding expenses
that do not require an expenditure of cash, such as depreciation, plus changes in key

The analysis omits the latter two components, “Cash flow from noncapital financing activities” and “Cash
flow from investing activities,” as both are, by definition, peripheral to a project’s operations.
6
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categories of working capital associated with operations.
•

Cash flow from capital expenditures and debt service (sometimes called cash flow
from financing activities (“CFFA”)) represents cash used to purchase capital assets
associated with the project (typically the property, plant, and equipment needed to
build the fiber network), proceeds from new capital debt financing, payments of
capital debt principal and interest due; and other long-term financing.

NCF can be used to evaluate a project’s viability in both the short- and long-run. In the
short-run, a project’s NCF should be sufficient to cover its obligations during every year of its
operations, with the expectation being that the debt proceeds will provide sufficient cash to cover
network construction costs in the initial years of operations before a project has the chance to
become profitable in later years. 7 If a project is unable to meet its cash obligations and requires
an infusion of additional cash from outside sources, it will have a negative cumulative NCF,
where cumulative NCF is the summation of NCF to date. Put another way, a project that is not
viable in the short run will have negative cumulative NCF.
Cumulative NCF can also be used to evaluate long-run solvency by measuring whether a
project is on track to generate sufficient cash by the maturity date of its initial debt to retire it.
More specifically, we look at each project’s cumulative NCF as of 2019 and the amount it
generated in the last three fiscal years for which we have complete data (2017, 2018, and 2019)
to estimate whether it is on track to pay back its debt by the maturity date of its initial debt. We
use the initial debt’s maturity date to assess long-run solvency because this is the date by which
the municipality expected to be able to pay off all of the principal and interest needed to finance
its fiber project when it initiated the project.

Accordingly, and as mentioned above, most debt instruments permit interest-only payments during a
project’s initial three-to-five years without requiring any principal repayment to give it time to ramp up. Thereafter,
operations are supposed to generate sufficient cash to cover the principal and interest due.
7
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To enable comparison across the municipal fiber projects, we had to make several
adjustments to CFFA to standardize the treatment of NCF. First, the vast majority of cities in
this study transferred funds from other internal sources (such as loans from other funds or
transfers of tax revenue from general funds) to cover cash flow shortfalls. Some of these cities
treated these transfers as capital funding and included it in CFFA, which artificially inflated their
NCF, while others treated them as noncapital funding that was not included in CFFA, which had
no effect on NCF. For this analysis, we have excluded from CFFA transfers from internal
sources because these projects are supposed to be self-supporting.
Second, we standardized CFFA to reflect how municipalities reported the debt used to
finance their fiber projects. For example, a large majority carried the debt used to finance these
projects on the books of their broadband divisions, while a minority opted to carry them in whole
or in part on the books of their electric power divisions. In addition, some cities refinanced or
defaulted on their debt for reasons that arose after the project’s initiation. For this analysis, we
have adjusted CFFA such that we treat all projects as if their initial debt were carried on the
books of their broadband divisions without any defaults or refinancing.
The combination of these adjustments yields the following formula for Adjusted NCF,
which allows these projects to be compared on an equal basis by excluding the impact of
decisions regarding whether to make internal transfers or to refinance or default on the initial
debt:
Adjusted NCF (“ANCF”) = CFO + CFFA + adjustment for internal transfers included in
CFFA + adjustment for differences in debt financing
To be clear, ANCF, like NCF, remains a true accounting of actual cash collected and spent by a
fiber project. The minor adjustments needed to make projects’ NCFs truly comparable does not
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change the fact that ANCF remains a metric based on actual cash flows and does not depend on
any assumptions or projections.
NCF is the primary basis that municipalities and their bond issuers use to forecast short
and long-term solvency at the time the bonds were issued. For example, illustrations of the
expected pattern of NCF are depicted in Table 1 and Figure 1, which are based on the Forecasted
Statement of Operations included in Appendix F to the official statement for the 2008 Bond
issued to finance the fiber project in Monticello, Minnesota. Again, this example differs from
the analysis of NCF and ANCF in this study because this example is based on Monticello’s
projected performance, not its actual performance. 8 (A comparison of Monticello’s forecast and
actual performance appears in Table 9 in Section 6.1.)

In these projections, adjusted NCF is the same as NCF because the projections necessarily do not include
any unexpected deviations that projects unexpectedly deployed that were not originally envisioned by the plan (e.g.,
transfers, refinancing).

8
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Table 1:
Forecast annual and cumulative NCF for Monticello, 2008–2015

Forecast cash flow from operating activities
Forecast additions to broadband plant
Forecast by financing activities
Forecast annual NCF
Forecast cumulative NCF

15

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

(468,885)
(10,961,191)
25,094,060

(2,016,902)
(3,575,820)
0

(549,531)
(2,363,979)
0

436,569
(726,031)
0

879,246
(624,904)
0

1,586,317
(1,265,741)
(70,000)

1,918,825
(434,799)
(220,000)

2,213,870
(404,149)
(380,000)

13,663,984
13,663,984

(5,592,722)
8,071,262

(2,913,510)
5,157,752

(289,462)
4,868,290

254,342
5,122,632

250,576
5,373,208

1,264,026
6,637,234

1,429,721
8,066,955

13.7 13.7

10

8.1

8.1
6.6
5.2

5

5.4

5.1

4.9

1.3
0.3

0

1.4

0.3

(0.3)
(2.9)

(5)
(5.6)

(10)
Forecast annual NCF

Forecast cumulative NCF

Figure 1: Forecast annual and cumulative NCF for Monticello, Minnesota, years 2018–2015 ($ million)
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The forecast projects positive NCF in year one because of the bond proceeds, negative
NCF during years two through four due to the slow startup of operations and the early capital
required to build the network, and increasingly positive NCF starting in year five. Regarding
short-run solvency, the bond proceeds are forecast to be large enough to ensure that cumulative
NCF remains positive even during the initial years of NCF deficits. After year four, the project
is expected to generate positive annual NCF that is sufficiently large to allow the project to cover
its obligations during every year of operations and to pay off its debt when it matures. As we
shall see, Monticello fell far short of its projected +$8.1 million cumulative NCF surplus by
2015, instead generating a ($4.7 million) deficit.
4.1.2

Theoretical performance: Net present value (“NPV”) of cash flow from operations
(“CFO”)
Another common approach to estimating the value of a project is capitalizing its income.

One standard way of doing so is calculating the project’s net present value (“NPV”) by summing
the project’s annual CFO, discounted by the project’s weighted average cost of capital
(“WACC”), and subtracting its overall project cost. This approach sets aside any shortcomings
in the actual approach employed to finance the project and focuses exclusively on the strength or
weakness of a project’s operating performance. In many ways, this analysis represents a bestcase scenario based on the assumption that the project made the optimal decisions regarding
capital expenditure and debt financing.
With that said, unlike the NCF and ANCF analysis described above, which is based
solely on these projects’ actual performance, an assessment of a project’s NPV requires a
number of assumptions concerning future growth (if any) and each project’s expected lifespan.
Thus, the NPV analysis contains some projection-related risks not associated with an analysis of

14

NCF or ANCF. Nevertheless, NPV analysis remains the best tool for a municipality to use when
considering the financial viability of a fiber project based on solely on its expected operating
efficiency.
As relevant here, if NPV is greater than or equal to zero as of 2019, the project has
already broken even and will remain viable so long as CFO does not turn negative in the future.
If NPV is negative as of 2019, the deficit can be divided by the years remaining until maturity of
the initial debt to determine the annual discounted CFO needed for the project to break even.
This can be compared to the project’s average annual discounted CFO in recent years to assess
whether the project’s recent performance is sufficient to make up that shortfall by the maturity
date. As with the cumulative NCF approach to evaluating long-term solvency, we use each
project’s performance over the past three fiscal years (2017, 2018, and 2019) to measure its
ability to make up any shortfalls without additional contributions from general revenues.
Sample forecasts are presented in Table 2 and Figure 2, which like Table 1 and Figure 1
are based on Appendix F of the official statement accompanying the 2008 Bond issued to finance
the fiber project in Monticello, Minnesota. As before, this illustration is based on Monticello’s
projected performance, not its actual performance. (A comparison of Monticello’s forecast and
actual performance appears in Table 10 in Section 6.2.)

15

Table 2:
Forecast annual and cumulative discounted CFO for Monticello, 2008–2015

Project cost
Forecast CFO
Forecast discounted CFO
NPV

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

(26,445,000)
(468,885)
(468,885)
(26,913,885)

(2,016,902)
(1,890,609)
(28,804,494)

(549,531)
(482,866)
(29,287,360)

436,569
359,587
(28,927,773)

879,246
678,857
(28,248,916)

1,586,317
1,148,087
(27,100,828)

1,918,825
1,301,779
(25,799,049)

2,213,870
1,407,898
(24,391,152)

5
0
(0.5)

1.4

1.3

1.1

0.7

0.4
(0.5)
(1.9)

(5)
(10)
(15)
(20)
(25)
(30)

(24.4)
(26.9)
(28.8)

(29.3)

(28.9)

(28.2)

Forecast annual discounted CFOA

(27.1)

(25.8)

NPV

Figure 2: Forecast annual and cumulative discounted CFO and NPV forecast for Monticello, 2008–2015 ($ million)
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This forecast projects an NPV of ($24.4 million) after the project’s first eight years,
reaching an annual discounted CFO of +$1.4 million in 2015. To generate positive NPV by the
initial bond maturity date of 2031, this project would have to generate an average annual
discounted CFO of +$1.5 million over the sixteen years from 2016 to 2031, inclusive. This
projection implicitly requires discounted CFO to grow at an annual growth rate of +0.5% over
that time in order to reach positive NPV and break even, which seems quite reasonable. The
analysis that follows reveals that Monticello’s actual performance did not meet its forecast,
generating an NPV that was ($7.7 million) below its forecast.
4.2

The data
The creation of the novel dataset underlying this analysis began with a systematic effort

to identify every municipal fiber project in the U.S. that received its initial financing in, or
before, fiscal year 2011. The issuance of the initial debt was used as the starting date for each of
these projects because that is the date from which the projects began accruing interest that must
be paid regardless of when the networks began generating revenue. Tracking data through fiscal
year 2019 provided at least ten years of data for all projects that are still operating and provides
complete data for projects that have already terminated operations. Ending the analysis before
fiscal year 2020 effectively avoids having to take the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic into
account.
The principal resource for identifying municipal fiber projects is Appendix 1 of the
Executive Office of the President’s January 2015 report on Community-Based Broadband
Solutions, which provides a comprehensive list of municipal broadband networks and identifies
the technology each one uses. We augmented this list by consulting other industry and scholarly
resources that list municipal fiber projects (e.g., Fiber-to-the-Home Council, 2009; Montagne
17

and Chaillou, 2010; Mitchell, 2012). Review of these lists identified eighty-eight municipal fiber
projects operating in fiscal year 2011.
We then examined the annual financial reports for these projects to determine how many
provided separate reports for their fiber operations. 9 A review of the annual financial reports
identified fifteen projects operating in 2011 that provided complete reports of their fiber
operations from project initiation through fiscal year 2019 or project termination. Basic data
about these projects appear in Table 3, including debt information, housing units, median
household income, and population density.

The annual reports were obtained from Bloomberg’s Data Transparency feature, the Electronic Municipal
Market Access Service (“EMMA”) of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC’s”) Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”), public postings to the Internet, and direct requests for information.

9
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Table 3:
Project and demographic data

Municipality

Fiscal
year of
initial
financing

Term of
initial
financing
(years)

Jackson, TN

2004

22

Provo, UT

2004

Windom, MN

Amount of
initial
financing

Population

Housing
units

Median
household
income

Population
per square
mile

54,300,000

67,187

25,925

46,112

1,152

22

39,500,000

116,616

34,454

53,864

2,799

2004

20

12,690,000

4,428

1,999

44,991

1,094

UTOPIA, UT

2005

22

185,000,000

474.442

148,226

70,908

2,925

Burlington, VT

2005

20

33,500,000

42,545

16,552

51,394

4,128

Morristown, TN

2005

25

19,500,000

29,782

11,639

32,193

1,089

Pulaski, TN

2006

19

8,500,000

7,643

3,189

31,519

1,018

Clarksville, TN

2007

25

41,675,000*

58.985

58,985

51,281

1,601

Wilson, NC

2007

26

31,800,000

49,272

19,667

42,036

1,584

Lafayette, LA

2007

24

125,000,000

126,199

52,267

51,477

2,274

Tullahoma, TN

2008

20

16,975,000

19,852

8,079

48,770

847

Chattanooga, TN

2008

25

280,600,000*

264,553

185,000

48,508

1,391

Monticello, MN

2008

23

26,445,000

13,583

4,984

65,398

1,552

Salisbury, NC

2009

21

35,865,000

33,727

12,524

41,901

1,513

Dunnellon, FL

2011

15

5,500,000

2,057

1,043

33,197

328

Low

2004

15

5,500,000

2,057

1,043

31,519

295

High

2011

26

185,000,000

474,442

185,000

70,465

4,119

Median

2007

22

31,800,000

41,500

16,552

48,770

1,528

Mean

2007

22

45,736,538

51,865

38,969

47,570

1,686

* Project financed by electric power division.

The total amount financed and WACC are derived from the text and the coupon rates for
the actual debt instruments or from the official statements that SEC rules require municipal bond
issuers to provide to underwriters. 10 For projects that used multiple rounds of funding to finance

The official statements were obtained from EMMA, Bloomberg, and public postings to the Internet. For
two projects (Burlington and Dunnellon), the information was derived from the actual loan agreements, which were
submitted during litigation over the default on the debt. Debt instruments that included financing for both fiber and
nonfiber projects (Chattanooga, Clarksville, Morristown, and Wilson) were allocated across the projects per the
infrastructure expenditures reflected in the official statements. All demographic data are taken from the U.S.
Census. Regarding the multicity projects, housing units for the Utah Open Infrastructure Agency (“UTOPIA”)
represent the total households in all of the pledging cities, and the median household income is for the median of the
pledging cities. Housing units for Chattanooga represent the total electric households served by the EPB, and
median household income is for the Chattanooga Metropolitan Statistical Area.

10
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principal construction, the project cost represents the total capital raised by the multiple rounds. 11
We made adjustments to the total amount financed so that we could compare all of the projects
as if they were financed as stand-alone broadband projects. This means that the total amount
financed omits any subsidies provided by state governments or the federal government. For
example, the total amount financed does not include Chattanooga’s stimulus funding of $111.6
million or UTOPIA’s funding of $16.2 million. We also made adjustments where the projects
were financed as smart grid projects; Chattanooga and Clarksville were financed as such,
meaning that the network construction costs and corresponding debt service (i.e., capital costs)
were carried by the electric power divisions of these independent authorities instead of their
broadband divisions, which paid periodic use charges to the electric power divisions
proportionate to their actual network usage (i.e., operating expenses). Converting these capital
expenses into pay-as-you-go operating expenses allowed these projects to shift the capital risk
associated with these networks to their electric power operations.
Interestingly, all of these projects are located in areas that satisfy the U.S. Census
definition of urban, and only one falls below the standard used by the U.S. Department of
Agricultural Economic Research Service that defines rural areas as those with a population
density of less than 500 persons per square mile.
Also notable is the fact that each of these projects was an overbuild of areas already
receiving broadband service from one or more private providers. None was a greenfield project
designed to provide service to residences who could not previously access broadband. The
presence of an incumbent led to several predictable dynamics that municipal fiber projects
should anticipate. For example, any incumbent in a market that is oligopolistic or monopolistic

11

These projects include Burlington, Lafayette, Morristown, UTOPIA, and Windom.
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is generally expected to respond to entry by a new competitor by dropping price. Indeed, as
noted earlier, inducing such price decreases was the goal behind projects such as Windom’s.
The municipal fiber projects in Monticello and Wilson regarded the incumbents’ price decreases
with suspicion, denouncing them as “predatory.” These claims overlook the fact that, unless the
prices charged are below cost, such decreases represent perhaps the primary dimension of
competition on the merits.
In addition, incumbents often questioned the legality of municipal fiber efforts. For
example, the incumbents in Burlington, Monticello, and Windom each contested the propriety of
the means used to finance the municipal fiber projects. Although each of these challenges
ultimately proved unsuccessful, the litigation delayed the projects, which caused them to forego
revenue and gave the incumbents time to improve their own networks.
To assess the representativeness of this sample, we compared the basic demographic data
of these projects with those of the overall universe of municipal fiber projects. The results are
summarized in Table 4, and the full results are reported in Online Appendix A.
Table 4:
Project and demographic data
Population

Housing
units

Median
household
income

Population
per square
mile

Median – study cities

41,500

16,096

47,310

1,452

Median – all municipal fiber cities

13,583

8,079

50,591

1,190

Mean – study cities

97,678

35,290

47,297

1,512

Mean – all municipal fiber cities

49,329

18,392

50,647

1,430

As illustrated in Table 4, the projects included in this study tended to be considerably
larger than the typical city supporting a municipal fiber project. This is unsurprising. Larger
projects, funded by larger cities are naturally more likely to be able to support the expense of

21

providing separate audited financial reports of their fiber operations, which were required to
complete this study The cities within this study are also denser and have a lower median
household income than the overall universe of municipal fiber projects. Two of these
characteristics—larger population size and higher population density—suggest that the sample
may reflect a slight bias toward more successful projects than the overall universe of municipal
fiber projects.. This is primarily driven by the reduced cost of fiber deployment in larger and
more densely populated areas. The third characteristic—median household income—is roughly
6% lower in the sample than in the overall population of municipal fiber projects, which
arguably creates a slight bias toward less successful projects. On balance, we expect any
selection biases that may exist to be small and to largely offset one another. To the extent any
overall sample bias exists, we believe it is more likely to cause the projects in the sample to
perform better financially than the overall population.

5

Results
We now apply the NCF and NPV analysis described above to these fifteen projects. Full

details are available in Online Appendix B.
5.1

Actual performance: Adjusted nominal cash flow (“ANCF”)
The results of our cumulative ANCF analysis are summarized in Table 5. The second

column assesses short-run solvency by examining the lowest cumulative ANCF during each
project’s life. If this number is negative, the project has not generated sufficient cash flow to
cover its costs in at least one year and has required infusions of additional cash from outside
sources to remain solvent.
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The other columns assess long-run solvency. The third column reports each project’s
cumulative ANCF as of 2019 to determine if it is currently running a deficit or surplus. The
fourth column reports the ANCF each project has generated over the past three fiscal years
(2017, 2018, and 2019). The fifth column uses the recent returns reported in the fourth column
to project how many years each project would need to make up for any deficits reported in the
third column. The sixth column, which reports the number of years until the maturity date of the
initial debt, can be compared with the fifth column to determine whether a project is on track to
repay its debt.
Table 5:
Cumulative ANCF analysis

Project
Chattanooga, TN

Lowest
cumulative
ANCF through
2019

Cumulative
ANCF as of
2019

Average
annual ANCF,
2017–19

Years to
break even
at 2017-19
ANCF rates

Years until
initial debt
maturity

(24,164,960)

68,578,465

22,742,128

0

15

(7,544,971)

(4,672,373)

731,218

6

14

Clarksville, TN

(28,536,619)

(23,218,789)

1,275,398

18

14

Lafayette, LA

(46,769,435)

(44,625,525)

714,637

62

13

Windom, MN

(2,376,777)

(1,988,432)

19,761

101

6

Jackson, TN

(6,857,654)

1,561,170

(1,002,459)

never

7

(194,672)

(194,672)

(533,779)

never

9

(3,317,057)

(3,317,057)

(453,755)

never

6

Morristown, TN

(14,579,821)

11

(16,732,246)

(874,204)
(1,768,214)

never

Monticello, MN

(14,579,821)
(16,732,246)

never

12

Salisbury, NC

(24,455,847)

(24,455,847)

(3,209,227)

never

10

UTOPIA, UT

(159,270,166)

(159,270,166)

(14,431,235)

never

8

(8,643,210)

(8,643,210)

n/a

never

7

Provo, UT

(11,126,580)

(9,765,585)

n/a

never

7

Burlington, VT

(32,059,526)

(32,059,526)

n/a

never

9

Wilson, NC

Tullahoma, TN
Pulaski, TN

Dunnellon, FL

In terms of actual performance, none of the fifteen projects satisfied the short-run test for
viability based on ANCF by generating cumulative ANCF surpluses every year of their
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operation. That means that all of the projects either required infusions of cash from outside
sources or debt relief through refinancing. The size of the peak cumulative ANCF deficits
ranged from ($0.2 million) to ($159.3 million), with the median peak deficit running ($14.6
million), and the average peak deficit running ($25.80 million). To date, Tullahoma’s short-run
deficit is fairly small, although recent returns suggest that it will widen unless its financial
performance substantially improves.
In terms of long-run viability, only two projects (13%) have generated sufficient
cumulative ANCF to be on track to cover their initial debt before it is scheduled to mature:
Chattanooga has already broken even, and Wilson would break even in six years if it is able to
maintain the level of performance it has achieved over the past three years, which would be well
before the maturity date of its initial debt in fourteen years. Of the remaining thirteen projects
(87%), only three generated positive cumulative ANCF over the last three fiscal years
(Clarksville, Lafayette, and Wilson), although at too low a level to break even by the maturity
date of their initial debt, although Clarksville is close. The remaining ten projects (67%) either
generated negative ANCF over the last three fiscal years or had already been sold at a significant
loss. Note that Jackson ran a small cumulative ANCF surplus through 2019, but its negative
ANCF over the past three fiscal years indicate that the surplus will turn into a deficit in roughly a
year and a half unless it substantially improves the fiscal performance of its operations.
Somewhat surprisingly, ten of the fifteen projects (67%) have either generated negative
cumulative ANCF over the past three fiscal years (2017, 2018, and 2019) or have already ceased
operations at a loss. Projects that generate negative cumulative and annual ANCF have no
chance of repaying their debt and, even worse, risk sinking further into debt with every year they
continue to operate.
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5.2

Theoretical performance: Net present value (“NPV”) of discounted cash flow from
operations (“CFO”)
The NPV analysis of these projects’ discounted CFO yields slightly different results,

which are reported in Table 6. The second column reports the project financing, adjusted as
described in Section 4.1.2 above. The third column reports the cumulative discounted CFO from
the initiation of the project through fiscal year 2019. The fourth column reports the projects’
NPV, calculated by subtracting the cumulative discounted CFO (third column) from the initial
project financing (second column). The fifth column reports the average annual discounted CFO
each project has generated over the past three fiscal years (2017, 2018, and 2019). The sixth
column uses the recent returns (fifth column) to project how many years each project would need
to make up for any deficits (fourth column). The seventh column reports the number of years
until the maturity date of the initial debt, which can be compared to the sixth column to
determine whether a project is on track to repay its debt.
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Table 6:
Cumulative lifetime discounted CFO and NPV analysis

Project
Jackson, TN
Chattanooga, TN
Wilson, NC
Morristown, TN
Lafayette, LA
Tullahoma, TN
Clarksville, TN
Pulaski, TN
Windom, MN
Salisbury, NC
Monticello, MN
UTOPIA, UT
Dunnellon, FL
Burlington, VT
Provo, UT

Initial
project
financing

Cumulative
discounted
CFO as of
2019

NPV as of
2019

54,300,000
280,600,000
29,190,000
19,500,000
125,000,000
16,975,000
41,675,000

76,617,231
228,523,244
22,234,399
12,604,555
71,568,919
10,473,169
6,145,754

22,317,231
(52,076,756)
(6,955,601)
(6,895,445)
(53,431,081)
(6,501,831)
(35,529,246)

Average
annual
discounted
CFO, 2017–
19
5,687,460
27,952,186
2,756,778
1,597,193
10,402,161
1,079,637
2,601,301

Estimated
years to
break even
as of 2019

Years until
initial debt
maturity

0
2
3
4
5
6
14

7
15
14
11
13
9
14

8,500,000
3,999,274
(4,500,726)
383,430
12
12,690,000
4,382,488
(8,307,512)
418,371
20
35,865,000
(795,753)
(36,660,753)
103,269
355
26,445,000
(5,895,812)
(32,340,812)
16,461
1,965
85,000,000 (17,538,964) (102,538,964)
(59,648)
never
7,350,000
(3,408,484)
(10,758,484)
n/a
n/a
33,500,000
3,399,230
(30,100,770)
n/a
n/a
39,500,000
2,118,521
(37,381,479)
n/a
n/a
* Project financed entirely by the electric power division and/or grants.

6
6
10
12
8
7
9
7

More than half of the fifteen projects (53%) are not on track to generate a positive NPV,
and thus breakeven, by the maturity date of their initial debt financing. Of these, three projects
(20%) have already ceased operations and thus no longer have any opportunity to make up their
deficits. One project (7%) generated negative CFO and fell even further behind in recent years
(UTOPIA). The remaining seven projects (47%) generated positive discounted CFO but will
have to improve their operations substantially in order to break-even.
Of the seven projects (47%) that are on track to break-even under NPV, one project (7%),
Jackson, has already generated positive NPV and continued to generate positive discounted CFO
over the past three fiscal years. The remaining six projects (40%) should generate positive NPV
well before the maturity dates of their initial debt. Notably, two of the projects with the largest
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deficits as of 2019, Lafayette at ($53.4 million) and Chattanooga at ($52.1 million), generated
sufficient discounted CFO in recent years to put them on track to break even in just a few years.
5.3

Synthesis of the three approaches to analyzing viability
Combining the three approaches to analyzing cash flow provides a robust assessment of

these projects’ viability, with the results summarized in Table 7.
Table 7:
Synthesis of the two approaches to analyzing cash flow
Project

Actual performance:
short-run viability

Actual performance:
long-run viability

Chattanooga, TN
Wilson, NC

X
X

Clarksville, TN
Jackson, TN
Lafayette, LA
Morristown, TN
Tullahoma, TN

Theoretical
performance:
long-run viability
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Pulaski, TN
Salisbury, NC
UTOPIA, UT
Windom, MN
Monticello, MN
Burlington, VT
Dunnellon, FL
Provo, UT

None of the fifteen projects, when corrected for changes in financing and cash infusions
from other sources, satisfied the test for actual short-run viability. In terms of long-run viability,
only two projects (14%) satisfied the tests based on both actual and theoretical performance:
Chattanooga and Wilson. Five additional projects (33%) failed the long-run test based on actual
performance but passed the test based on theoretical performance. Eight projects (53%) failed
the tests of long-run viability based on both actual and theoretical performance.
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5.4

Internal details of project performance
Closer analysis of the internal details of these fifteen projects’ financial performance

provides additional insights. Table 8 provides an overview of which projects required external
funding, used refinancing to defer aspects of their debt service, saw a significant downgrade to
their bond rating, defaulted on their debt, or were sold to other entities at a loss.
Table 8:
Internal details of project performance
External funding
Project
Jackson, TN
Provo, UT
Windom, MN
UTOPIA, UT
Burlington, VT
Morristown, TN
Pulaski, TN
Clarksville, TN
Wilson, NC
Lafayette, LA
Tullahoma, TN
Chattanooga, TN
Monticello, MN
Salisbury, NC
Dunnellon, FL

Tax
dollars

Interfund
loans

X

X
X
X

X
X

Backing
with
taxing
power

Refinance deferrals
Principal
repayment

Maturity
date

X

X

X
X

X
X

Default

Disposal

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

Bond
rating
downgrade

X
X

X
X
X

Negative
statements
in annual
report

X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X

Despite the fact that all fifteen projects were supposed to be self-sustaining, fourteen
projects (93%) received additional funds from outside sources, with the sole exceptions being
Tullahoma and Pulaski. This additional funding took on different forms, with some cities relying
on more than one source. Six projects (40%) received contributions supported by tax dollars
(Burlington, Dunnellon, Monticello, Provo, Salisbury, and UTOPIA). Eleven projects (69%)
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received interfund loans from other municipal units. Many projects borrowed significant
amounts, with the peak of these loans averaging 37% of the initial debt financing.
Ten projects (67%) declined to back their debt with the cities’ taxing power and full faith
and credit. Of these, three projects (20%) nonetheless provided support for the municipal fiber
projects out of their general funds despite the specific language in the debt instrument protecting
these cities from having to do so (Burlington, Monticello, and Salisbury).
Five projects (33%) used refinancing to mitigate their debt obligations. Four projects
(27%) deferred the date when repayment of principal was to begin (Burlington, Jackson,
Morristown, Salisbury). Four projects (27%) extended the maturity date of the debt (Jackson,
Morristown, UTOPIA, and Windom).
Six cities (40%) included negative statements about their fiber operations in their annual
reports, although all but two of them (Lafayette and Salisbury) had addressed those issues by
2019. Six projects (40%) saw significant downgrades to their bond ratings, although one has
recovered (Burlington). Three projects (20%) have defaulted on their debt (Burlington,
Dunnellon, and Monticello). Of these, two projects (13%) stopped servicing their debt just
before principal repayments were supposed to begin (Burlington and Monticello). The
remaining project (7%) made the necessary payments until it disposed of the project during its
fourth year of operations, when it settled its debt for less than its full value (Dunnellon). Three
projects (20%) sold their operations at significant losses (Burlington, Dunnellon, and Provo).

6

Comparing the Forecast vs. Actual Performance for Three Projects
The wide variability in outcomes invites further inquiry into what factors drive success

and failure. One approach to determining why municipal fiber projects succeed or fail is to
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compare a project’s financial forecast with its actual performance. Three municipal fiber
projects included pro forma projections of their financial performance as appendices to their
official bond statements: Lafayette, Monticello, and Windom. Their inclusion allows us to
compare these projects forecast vs. actual financial performance under both of our measures.
6.1

Actual performance: Adjusted nominal cash flow (“ANCF”)
A comparison of the projected versus actual financial performance for these three

projects in terms of NCF appears in Table 9.
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Table 9:
Forecast vs. actual annual and cumulative discounted NCF for Lafayette, Monticello, and Windom
Lafayette

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Forecast annual NCF

114,249,291

(54,931,139)

(28,870,820)

Actual annual ANCF

112,328,272

(36,032,608)

(50,086,859)

(21,994,851)

6,626,788

10,427,865

12,836,428

(24,943,506)

(17,050,668)

4,324,114

(5,836,755)

(1,921,019)

18,898,531

(21,216,039)

(2,948,655)

(23,677,456)

(6,103,751)

(18,673,183)

(15,313,248)

Forecast cumulative NCF

114,249,291

Actual cumulative ANCF

112,328,272

59,318,152

30,447,332

8,452,481

15,079,269

25,507,134

38,343,562

50,318,199

65,649,902

84,666,586

76,295,664

26,208,805

1,265,299

(15,785,369)

(11,461,255)

(17,298,010)

(20,636,621)

(25,257,779)

(25,770,916)

Difference

(1,921,019)

16,977,512

(4,238,527)

(7,187,182)

(30,864,638)

(36,968,389)

(55,641,572)

(70,954,820)

(90,907,681)

(110,437,502)

Monticello

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Forecast annual NCF

13,663,984

(5,592,722)

(2,913,510)

(289,462)

254,342

250,576

1,264,026

1,429,721

Actual annual ANCF

23,178,435

(7,601,472)

(9,436,684)

(5,442,873)

(2,817,900)

(3,061,050)

(10,481,375)

(2,298,306)

9,514,451

(2,008,750)

(6,523,174)

(5,153,411)

(3,072,242)

(3,311,626)

(11,745,401)

(3,728,027)

Forecast cumulative NCF

13,663,984

8,071,262

5,157,752

4,868,290

5,122,632

5,373,208

6,637,234

8,066,955

Actual cumulative ANCF

23,178,435

15,576,963

6,140,279

697,406

(2,120,494)

(5,181,544)

(15,662,919)

(17,961,225)

9,514,451

7,505,701

982,527

(4,170,884)

(7,243,126)

(10,554,752)

(22,300,153)

(26,028,180)

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Forecast annual NCF

(140,677)

187,352

(75,365)

39,923

111,902

136,229

165,613

229,245

Actual annual ANCF

(337,385)

(77,308)

(663,913)

1,025,149

(349,122)

(1,469,191)

(22,305)

(282,702)

Difference

(196,708)

(264,660)

(588,548)

985,226

(461,024)

(1,605,420)

(187,918)

(511,947)

Forecast cumulative NCF

(140,677)

46,675

(28,690)

11,233

123,135

259,364

424,977

654,222

Actual cumulative ANCF

(337,385)

(414,693)

(1,078,606)

(53,457)

(402,579)

(1,871,770)

(1,894,075)

(2,176,777)

Difference

(196,708)

(461,368)

(1,049,916)

(64,690)

(525,714)

(2,131,134)

(2,319,052)

(2,830,999)

Difference

Difference

Difference
Windom
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2013

2014

2015

2016

11,974,637

15,331,703

19,016,684

(3,338,611)

(4,621,158)

(513,137)

(19,952,861)

(19,529,821)

All three of these projects’ actual performance fell far short of their forecasts. While
Lafayette was forecast to begin running NCF surpluses in its fifth year, it actually ran ANCF
deficits for all ten years covered by the forecasts. The predicted $84.7 million cumulative NCF
surplus was actually a ($25.8 million) ANCF deficit, for a shortfall of ($110.4 million).
Monticello was also forecast to begin running NCF surpluses in its fifth year, while it
actually ran ANCF deficits for all eight years covered by the forecast despite the fact that it
defaulted on its debt and stopped making debt payments in its fifth year. The forecasted $8.1
million cumulative NCF surplus was actually a ($18.0 million) deficit, for a shortfall of ($26.0
million). To get a sense of the magnitude of this shortfall, for both Lafayette and Monticello, the
cumulative deficit was roughly the same size as the initial bond debt borrowed to finance the
entire project.
Windom underperformed but to a lesser extent than the other two projects. Forecasts
projected that Windom would begin running NCF surpluses in year four, and it actually
generated a significantly greater ANCF surpluses in that year before reverting to negative ANCF.
The projected $229 thousand cumulative NCF surplus was actually a ($283 thousand)
cumulative ANCF deficit, for a cumulative shortfall of ($512 thousand). While still negative,
this shortfall is much smaller than the $12.7 million needed to finance the overall project.
6.2

Theoretical performance: Net present value (“NPV”) of discounted cash flow from
operations (“CFO”)
The availability of CFO forecasts for three projects allows us to focus more narrowly on

their operational performance as compared to forecasts. Both forecast and actual CFO are
presented in Table 10.

32

Table 10:
Forecast vs. actual annual and cumulative CFO for Lafayette, Monticello, and Windom
Lafayette

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Forecast annual CFO

887,757

(2,229,287)

(1,562,305)

10,612,738

19,157,937

22,688,720

24,594,879

27,084,681

27,916,573

30,132,584

Actual annual CFO

(32,232)

(1,836,668)

(3,018,092)

(462,491)

2,256,273

6,927,545

10,083,645

14,093,749

15,140,084

15,727,652

(919,989)

392,619

(1,455,787)

(11,075,229)

(16,901,664)

(15,761,175)

(14,511,234)

(12,990,932)

(12,776,489)

(14,404,932)

Forecast cumulative CFO

887,757

(1,341,530)

(2,903,835)

7,708,903

26,866,840

49,555,560

74,150,439

101,235,120

129,151,693

159,284,277

Actual cumulative CFO

(32,232)

(1,868,900)

(4,886,992)

(5,349,483)

(3,093,210)

3,834,335

13,917,980

28,011,729

43,151,813

58,879,465

Difference

(919,989)

(527,370)

(1,983,157)

(13,058,386)

(29,960,050)

(45,721,225)

(60,232,459)

(73,223,391)

(85,999,880)

(100,404,812)

Monticello

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

(468,885)

(2,016,902)

(549,331)

436,569

879,246

1,586,317

1,918,825

2,213,870

Difference

Forecast annual CFO
Actual annual CFO

(78,776)

(293,576)

(1,560,790)

(2,085,220)

(1,052,562)

(984,045)

(851,502)

(189,943)

Difference

390,109

1,723,326

(1,011,459)

(2,521,789)

(1,931,808)

(2,570,362)

(2,770,327)

(2,403,813)

(468,885)

(2,485,787)

(3,035,118)

(2,598,549)

(1,719,303)

(132,986)

1,785,839

3,999,709

Forecast cumulative CFO
Actual cumulative CFO

(78,776)

(372,352)

(1,933,142)

(4,018,362)

(5,070,924)

(6,054,969)

(6,906,471)

(7,096,414)

Difference

390,109

2,113,435

1,101,976

(1,419,813)

(3,351,621)

(5,921,983)

(8,692,310)

(11,096,123)

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Forecast annual CFO

(215,850)

(262,162)

(49,940)

63,623

162,327

234,929

316,038

417,945

Actual annual CFO

(509,228)

(1,031,619)

194,478

519,223

399,752

615,549

596,956

599,487

Difference

(293,378)

(769,457)

244,418

455,600

237,425

380,620

280,918

181,542

Forecast cumulative CFO

(215,850)

(478,012)

(527,952)

(464,329)

(302,002)

(67,073)

248,965

666,910

Actual cumulative CFO

(509,228)

(1,540,847)

(1,346,369)

(827,146)

(427,394)

188,155

785,111

1,384,598

Difference

(293,378)

(1,062,835)

(818,417)

(362,817)

(125,392)

255,228

536,146

717,688

Windom
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Again, Lafayette and Monticello significantly underperformed expectations. Lafayette
began producing CFO surpluses in year five, only one year later than forecasted, but the size of
these surpluses in years five to ten fell far enough below forecasts that the cumulative deficit
reached ($100.4 million).
Regarding Monticello, despite being forecast to begin generating positive operational
cash flow in its fourth year, Monticello failed to generate positive CFO throughout the eight year
forecast period. The total shortfall in cumulative CFO reached ($11.1 million).
Windom provides a comparative bright spot, generating positive CFO in its third year,
one year ahead of schedule. The cumulative CFO over Windom’s first eight years of operation
exceeded forecasts by $717 thousand. While better than Lafayette’s or Monticello’s, this level of
performance still lagged behind the pace needed to cover Windom’s debt, as indicated in Table
6.
6.3

Analyzing the determinants of viability
The variability of these results invite further analysis of which aspects were primarily

responsible for the differences in these projects’ financial performance. Table 11 presents a
summary of nine potential factors.
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Table 11:
Projected versus actual performance for Lafayette, Monticello, and Windom

Customers
in the final
year of the
forecast
period*
Operating
revenue
Average
revenue
per user
(ARPU)

Lafayette
2007–2016

Monticello
2008–2015

Windom
2004–2011

29,555
17,686
(11,869)
-40%

2,543
1,487
(1,056)
-42%

1,188
1,073
(115)
-10%

Projected

367,113,147

37,699,878

12,814,000

Actual

186,314,498

10,567,972

11,329,437

(180,798,649)

(27,131,906)

(1,484,563)

Pct. difference

-49%

-72%

-12%

Projected
Actual
Difference
Pct. difference

12,421
10,535
(1,887)
-15%

14,825
7,107
(7,718)
-52%

10,786
10,559
(228)
-2%

(207,828,869)

(33,114,151)

(11,300,991)

Actual

(94,216,489)

(19,471,147)

(14,606,820)

Difference

Projected
Actual
Difference
Pct. difference

Difference

Projected
Operating
expense
Operating
expenses /
operating
revenue

113,612,380

13,643,004

(3,305,829)

Pct. difference

-55%

-41%

+29%

Projected
Actual
Difference
Pct. difference

-57%
-51%
6%
11%

-88%
-184%
-96%
-110%

-88%
-129%
-41%
-46%

159,284,278

4,585,727

1,177,349

Projected
Operating
income

Actual

(32,509,994)

(8,903,175)

(3,277,383)

(191,794,272)

(13,488,902)

(4,454,732)

-120%

-294%

-378%

Projected

(125,998,195)

(20,356,614)

(8,376,101)

Actual

(127,387,523)

(15,178,684)

(9,481,853)

(1,389,328)

5,177,930

(1,105,752)

+1%

-25%

+13%

155,182,418

3,999,509

666,910

Difference
Pct. difference

Additions
to plant

Difference
Pct. difference
Projected

CFO

Actual

28,011,729

(7,095,414)

1,384,598

(127,170,689)

(11,094,923)

717,688

-82%

-277%

+108%

Projected

(62,777,862)

(12,331,000)

(4,609,570)

Actual

(53,849,276)

(13,766,869)

(4,607,735)

8,928,586

(1,435,869)

1,835

Difference
Pct. difference

Debt
service

Difference

Pct. difference
-14%
+12%
+0%
* Includes only data customers for Monticello and Windom; includes
combined data, telephone, and cable television customers for Lafayette
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The primary driver of Windom’s somewhat more positive results appears to be its
relative success in acquiring customers. Its customer total in 2011 fell only -10% short of
forecasts, which was much smaller than Lafayette’s -40% or Monticello’s -42% shortfalls. As a
result, Windom’s revenue fell short of forecasts by only -12%, compared to -49% for Lafayette
and -72% for Monticello. These differences in shortfall clearly resulted from the number of
customers, rather than the amount of revenue generated from each customer, as Windom and
Lafayette generated similar ARPU of roughly +$10,500, with Monticello only slightly behind.
Operating efficiency appears to have played a less significant a role. The ratio of
Windom’s operating expenses to operating revenue underperformed expectations by -46%.
Similarly, Monticello’s operating efficiency was -110% versus expectations. This did not
prevent either Windom or Monticello from outperforming Lafayette in terms of CFO, despite
Lafayette’s +11% improvement in operating efficiency as compared to expectations.
The role of capital expenses is similarly unclear. The fact that Windom’s additions to
plant exceeded forecasts by +13% did not prevent it from meeting expectations in terms of CFO.
Conversely, Monticello’s -25% lower expenditures on additions to plant compared with forecasts
did not lift its performance above Windom’s. Lafayette’s capital expenditures were right in line
with forecasts, exceeding them by a mere +1%.

7

Conclusion
To date, debates over municipal fiber have been long on rhetoric and short on systematic

empirical assessment of financial performance. And to the extent scholars have offered any
assessment of municipal fiber projects, they have stemmed from cherry-picked case studies and
analysis of inappropriate financial metrics. This analysis fills the void and provides cities
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weighing whether to initiate a municipal fiber project with hard data based on the actual
performance of existing municipal fiber projects to inform their decisions whether to proceed.
An examination of the actual performance of the fifteen projects for which complete data
since 2011 are available reveals that none of them satisfied the standard test of short-run
financial viability, which required them to receive infusions of additional cash from outside
sources or obtain some form of debt relief. In terms of long-run viability, again measured by
actual performance, thirteen projects (87%) generated insufficient ANCF to put them on track to
repay their debt by the date their initial debt is scheduled to mature. Moreover, eleven projects
(73%) have either already defaulted or generated negative cumulative ANCF over the past three
fiscal years, which leaves them poorly positioned unless they substantially improve their
operations. An assessment of theoretical, best-case performance based on the NPV of CFO
reveals that, even if these projects had achieved optimal performance for capital expenditures
and debt service, the majority of the projects (53%) generated insufficient discounted CFO to
cover their project costs.
Closer analysis of the projects in our study reveals further problems. Although all fifteen
were expected to be self-sustaining, thirteen (87%) received further infusions of cash. Six of the
projects (40%) received such infusions from general revenue even though three of those (20%)
declined to back their initial debt with their general taxing power. Five projects (33%) used
refinancing to defer the due date of principal repayment or to extend the maturity date of the
debt. Six projects (40%) saw downgrades to their bond ratings. Three projects (20%) have
defaulted on their debt. Three projects (20%) have already been liquidated at significant losses.
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An analysis of the reasons for success and failure suggests that the ability to generate
revenue played the most significant role. Efficiency in capital costs and operating efficiency
appear to have exerted less influence over the results.
These results suggest that decisionmakers should carefully assess the possibility that a
municipal fiber network might struggle and include the costs associated with dealing with that
outcome when deciding whether to initiate such a project. At a minimum, this study suggests
that adequate due diligence would require an analysis of whether the current project more closely
resembles the projects that succeeded or failed. This analysis should be premised on the
documented reality that a project will not rapidly gain subscribers following launch and the
economic reality that that an incumbent’s natural response to entry by a new market competitor
is to drop price. Practically, our study underscores the importance of municipalities considering
whether to initiate a fiber project to focus on operational cash flow and not just the total capital
expenditure of the project. Due diligence should also include consulting the municipal leaders of
prior projects that struggled to reach short and long-term viability and establishing contingency
plans in case a project fails to perform as expected.
Given the recent passage of the BIF, municipalities considering a municipal fiber project
would also be well served to consider whether there are alternate and cost-effective means of
ensuring that members of their communities have access stable and high-speed internet services.
For example, in light of the recent availability of federal funds, municipal officials may
determine that it is a more efficient use of public funds to offer subsidies to citizens in regions
where an incumbent is already offering high-speed internet service.
Because the projects in this study consist entirely of overbuilds, these data say little about
the prospects of greenfield projects in which the municipality is currently unserved by any
38

incumbents. The fact that the BIF program prioritizes unserved areas over underserved areas
make this omission critical. Whether greenfield municipal fiber projects would be more likely to
succeed is unclear. On the one hand, greenfield projects necessarily involve areas other
providers regard as relatively unattractive. On the other hand, greenfield projects would not face
competition. This study does suggest that municipalities who are overbuilding competitors
engage in a rigorous due diligence process (using proper financial metrics) to balance the short
and long-term viability of the project and the benefits the community will receive from the
proposed project.
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